This article presents the views of four sets of authors, each taking concepts of embodied cognition into problem spaces where the new paradigm can be applied. The first considers consequences of embodied cognition on the legal system. The second explores how embodied cognition can change how we interpret and interact with art and literature. The third examines how we move through architectural spaces from an embodied cognition perspective. And the fourth addresses how music cognition is influenced by the approach. Each contribution is brief. They are meant to suggest the potential reach of embodied cognition, increase the visibility of applications, and inspire potential avenues for research.
1. Law and embodiment
Adam Benforado
Law students are taught that judges and jurors are influenced by the power of arguments: outcomes in court are determined by how successfully each side marshals evidence and applies the relevant legal principles to the facts of the case. Thus, an attorney must appeal to the minds of his audience to win, but can safely ignore their bodies. An embodied cognition approach to law flips this traditional account on its head and asserts that the sensorimotor experiences of legal actors are intimately tied to their abstract thinking 2 . Inside the courtroom, the hardness of the chairs, the brightness of the lighting, the smell of the floor polish, the placement of the jury box, and the weight of files may all affect the proceedings (Benforado, 2010) .
Consider a murder trial in which the defense counsel requests a recess after photographs of the bloody crime scene are shown to the jury. During the break, jurors head to the bathrooms, where they use the facilities and then wash their hands. Although conventional dualist legal analysis implies that hand washing is immaterial to a juror's decision-making, an embodied cognition perspective suggests that it might be critical. Moral purity and physical purity are linked (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008) . In one experiment, after watching a disgusting movie clip, participants assessed various moral dilemmas (e.g., keeping money found in a wallet). Half of participants were asked to wash their hands prior to making their judgments and half were not. The simple act of soaping up made a big difference: those who had cleansed themselves after being primed for disgust offered less-severe moral judgments than those who had not.
Even before trial, an embodied cognition perspective on law suggests that bodily experiences at key moments in our judicial processes may subtly bias proceedings and lead to outcomes that do not align with our purported values of fairness and equal treatment (Benforado, 2010) . Subtle hand gestures by police officers may encourage eyewitnesses to make erroneous identifications (Broaders & Goldin-Meadow, 2010) . And detectives drinking hot coffee, rather than ice water, may assess suspects as more trustworthy and credible during interrogations (Williams & Bargh, 2008) .
Future research is needed to investigate the robustness of embodied cognition effects in specifically legal contexts and to understand the impact of interpersonal differences. Only then can we tackle tough questions like whether we should pass new procedural rules barring the imposition of certain sensorimotor experiences or redesign our courtrooms to offer experiences conducive to generosity, trust, and careful consideration. The further development of an embodiment perspective on law is not without costs. Certain individuals and entities-particularly those who can afford high-priced trial consultants-are likely to use insights from the field to manipulate jurors, judges, and others to stack the cards in their favor. Similarly, we must be conscious that in revealing that participants in our judicial system are not rational actors driven by reason alone, embodied cognition research presents a challenge to the legitimacy of our legal institutions and practices. Imagine reading a fiction about a seamstress' hand moving through soft fabric or standing in a museum gazing at a painting of a woman embroidering a handkerchief. One might sense a physical tension in the fingers or the tactile quality of the cloth and feel somehow immersed bodily in the work. Here, one would be imitating bodily-though a simulation-what is represented in words or images. Twentieth century scholars paid little attention to such reports, for they regarded the cognitive activity of reading and viewing as fundamentally nonbodily. However, scholarly attitudes are changing under the influence of a broad set of scientific ⁄ philosophical theories that characterize cognition as embodied-as inextricably involving bodily processes and being situated in a particular time and space. Body-driven research into literature and the visual arts is now emerging, and it offers insights into more general areas of the sciences.
The experience of having one's bodily boundaries extended, of feeling immersed in literature and art receives attention in Esrock (2001 Esrock ( , 2004 Esrock ( , 2010 Esrock ( , 2012 , which proposes the ''transomatization'' as an alternative to simulation accounts of these experiences (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Glenberg et al., 2008) . In transomatizations, a reader's ⁄ viewer's bodily processes serve as a nonimitative (''trans-somatic'') substitute for components of the verbal ⁄ visual world. These bodily processes include breathing, muscular tensions, and all over awareness of the internal milieu (interoception), which from some perspectives (Damasio, 1999) constitutes an emotion and carries a sense of selfhood. As illustration of this substitution, a text reads: ''Amy gazes at the rhythmic light beams stroking the floor.'' The reader who forms a transomatization would permit her rhythmic experience of breathing to stand for Amy's perceptual experience of the rhythmic light beams.
Bodily immersion is only one line of investigation into embodied reading ⁄ viewing. Keen (2007) investigates empathy in literature, using a model of embodied cognition that considers the emotions as bodily, and this focus on bodily expression informs research like Warhol's (2003) on crying when reading and Freedberg and Gallese (2007) on visual art perception. Such work draws implicitly on theories of language that have become foundational to embodiment studies: those of Johnson (1980, 1999) , which hold that our bodily experiences in the world are reflected in metaphors that govern language use and concepts in all domains. This thesis has been the basis for Turner's investigations into the structures of narrative and the development of embodied cognitive architectures (Turner, 1996; Turner & Fauconnier, 2002) .
The literary ⁄ visual investigations of embodied cognition might be useful to other disciplines by illuminating otherwise unrecognized areas of human thought, emotion, and behavior. This is because these esthetic works are complex constructions that afford especially nuanced experiences of affect and meaning. For example, by studying the processes of interpretation and creation, cognitive scientists might enhance their understanding of how somatosensory (trans-somatic) substitutes can help keep several streams of information readily available and how even interoceptive awareness and breathing play a role in regulating our cognitive and affective processing of external objects. Furthermore, the methods for teaching embodied subjects how to read and view literature ⁄ art might reveal practices for developing cognitive and affective skills in other areas of life.
3. Experiencing the built environment: An embodied approach
Alasdair Turner and Ruth Conroy Dalton
Imagine visiting a building for the first time. This could be a building that encourages pleasurable exploration, such as a museum or gallery, or your purpose might be commonplace and functional, to a hospital or airport. On crossing the threshold into this novel environment, how do you begin to experience, understand, and structure the available sensory information? Conversely, imagine arriving in a new city: how do you start to construct an internal representation (or cognitive map) of the place? In other words, how is it that we experience the built environment, especially locations characterized by significant spatial complexity (numerous discrete spaces, highly interconnected, with indistinct overall structure, and the whole unperceivable from a single vantage point)?
If we start with a hypothesis that we cognize complex, spatial environments by moving through them, then two possible methodological approaches to this question are observing people's patterns of movement and simulative ⁄ experimental. In earlier work, Dalton recorded the paths of experiment participants navigating through virtual simulations of complex built environments (Conroy Dalton, 2003) and Turner programmed ''cognitive agents'' to simulate real-world, explorative tasks (Turner, 2007) . Both sets of results were validated against pedestrian-movement data drawn from real settings. The resultant paths taken by Dalton's experiment participants and Turner's cognitive agents show a strong preference for straighter rather than meandering routes (even when paths with more changes of direction are of a shorter distance). Furthermore, evidence from spatial cognition ⁄ psychology suggests that we form some kind of mental representation of real-world places that, rather than being a literal ''map in the head,'' is a sparse and highly efficient representation of the environment in which certain features such as direct paths between locations, the egocentric angles at which paths cross, and visually salient features along routes and at path intersections (landmarks) are prominent (Golledge, 1999; Siegel & White, 1975) .
This, of course, begs the question of why should highly linear routes be so fundamental to our cognition of an environment? Can an embodied cognitive approach explain people's apparent predilection for linearized spatial representations? Turner (2007) argues that this phenomenon can only arise from the combination of an embodied agent and its immediate spatial system. In addition, Dalton suggests that the experience of moving through spaces relates to physical characteristics of our bodies: our left-right symmetries, front-back asymmetries, the position of our eyes and associated field of view relative to our direction of gait (2005) .
In this section, we proposed the composite theory that when moving through any novel environment, our disposition is to immediately attempt to structure environmental 13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 information to form an internal representation for further use ⁄ retrieval and presented our findings that people favor strongly linear routes suggesting that any mental representations might be similarly linearized. This has important consequences for built environment design: first, for architects and urban planners designing complex environments, the knowledge that linear routes are preferred can guide the design process and help to predict resultant pedestrian movement rates; second, when designing physical maps, route guides, or producing verbal directions, the knowledge that straighter routes are cognitively privileged can serve as design guidelines or heuristics.
Embodied music cognition

Leon van Noorden and Marc Leman
Embodied music cognition sees music experience as based on perception and action. For example, many people move when they listen to music and in many cultures there is no clear distinction between music and dance. Through movement, it is assumed that people give meaning to music. This is different from the traditional (disembodied) approach to music cognition, which bases musical meaning on merely perception-based analysis of musical structure. Through measurement of sound, movement, human physiology, and computational modeling, music-embodied cognition is currently building up reliable knowledge about the role of the human body in meaning formation. A general introduction to embodied music cognition is provided by Leman (2007) .
Embodied music cognition is potentially applicable to understanding the role of music in other forms of cognition, such as spatial cognition. For example, Leman and Naveda (2010) introduce the concept of spatiotemporal frames of reference, as an alternative to the (traditional) concept of mental representation. Frames of reference provide coordination points for movement in space and time, dependent on biomechanics of the human body. This provides for a new type of gesture analysis, based on topology of movements under spatiotemporal constraints (Godøy & Leman, 2009; .
Furthermore, embodied music cognition is potentially applicable to better understanding the role of music in social interactions. For example, De Bruyn, Moelants, Coussement, and and De Smet, Leman, Lesaffre, and De Bruyn (2010) show that children move more in synchrony with music when they dance as a group. Of particular importance is the role of a resonant perception-action coupling around 2 Hz. van Noorden and Moelants (1999) have shown that subjective rhythmitization can be explained by this resonance. Styns, van Noorden, Moelants, and Leman (2007) have shown that changes in walking behavior happen close to 2 Hz. And, children 3-and 4-years old can synchronize only in the neighborhood of 2 Hz. By contrast, from 5 years on, they can synchronize gradually in a wider range of tempi. It is as if older children learn to put brakes on the resonator. This enables them to synchronize in a range from a bit faster to more extensively slower tempi (e.g., Drake, Jones, & Baruch, 2000) . In addition, it may be that rocking babies at 2 Hz is the most effective frequency for putting them to sleep (Ter Vrugt & Pederson, 1973) .
Embodied music cognition has a strong connection with technology development, which has extended its role within spatial and social cognition, and beyond. Mediation technology can give the human body, and the human mind, an extension in the digital musical domain. An example is DJogger (Moens, van Noorden, & Leman, 2010) , which provides music at exactly the tempo of your walking or running. Another example is the ''Sync-in-team'' game (Leman, Demey, Lesaffre, van Noorden, & Moelants, 2009 ), which applies synchronization and entrainment in a social music interaction game. The embodied music cognition approach starts getting a tremendous impact in the field of interactive multimedia (Correia Da Silva Diniz et al., 2010 3 ; Deweppe, Lesaffre, & Leman, 2009) , where natural (embodied) mappings between human gestures and control parameters of the system (Maes, Leman, Lesaffre, Demey, & Moelants, 2010) are essential for the experience of presence and flow (Nijs, Coussement, Müller, Lesaffre, & Leman, 2010) .
In contrast with traditional music cognition, embodied music cognition might change how music is understood. Rather than focusing on perception, the embodied approach focuses on the tight coupling between perception and action in meaning formation. It considers how the biomechanics of the human body contributes to cognition, and provides a new way of addressing emotions, through movement. This approach also allows the development of models of social cognition, which link with recent neuroscience work (Leman, 2007) , using concepts of movement and emotion synchronicity or entrainment . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 
